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Abstract 
 
The timing of export controls and the state of technological capability of a ‘target’ country at a given time 
appear to determine the degree of impact of export controls on a ‘target’ country.  The impact is likely to be 
much greater in the formative phase than in the accumulative phase of technology accumulation.  Also, the 
export controls, instead of hampering, could provide an incentive for a strong indigenous effort in building 
capabilities, eventually making a ‘target country more independent and more immune to export controls.  
India’s space programme makes an interesting case study of the impact of export controls on capability 
building, as India has been one of the targets for export control regimes.  The technology developments in 
India’s space programme suggests that the export controls have caused only small delays and did not affect 
the programme seriously.  It appears that the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) came into force 
too late to have a serious adverse impact on India, as India has already attained threshold capabilities.  It 
also appears that export controls have forced India to plan and strategically manage indigenous technology 
development to overcome problems posed by these controls. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Multilateral export control regimes have been established by developed countries to 
prevent certain ‘target’ countries from acquiring capabilities in complex dual-use 
technologies that could be used to develop weapons of mass destruction.  It appears that 
the impact of export controls, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 
on a particular country depends upon the stage of its technological capability at the time 
export controls are imposed and its potential to sustain innovative activities on its own.  If 
it is in an initial stage, that is the formative stage, then the impact will be greater to the 
point of crippling the growth of technological accumulation. For example, if that country 
is running a missile programme, it is likely to be seriously impeded as the foreign input is 
very important at this stage.  On the other hand, if the country is in an advanced stage, 
that is the accumulative stage, where the role of foreign input is less determinant, the 
export controls will be less influential. Therefore, the timing of controls on technology 
transfer and the stage of technological capability of a recipient country at a given time 
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greatly influence the impacts of export controls.  Also, the export controls, instead of 
hampering, could provide an incentive for a strong indigenous effort in building 
capabilities, eventually making a target country more independent of foreign technology 
than it might otherwise have been. 
 
India’s space programme makes an interesting case study of the effectiveness of export 
controls on building technological capabilities.  India has been one of the primary targets 
of various export controls since it exploded a nuclear device in 1974.  Its nuclear, space 
and missile programmes have been subjected to severe export controls by the Western 
countries. The timing of MTCR and the stage of India’s technological capability when it 
came to force appear to have determined the extent MTCR could influence further 
competence building under the space or missile programme.  
 
The technology development process in India’s space programme also suggest that it is 
very likely that India would have continued to be dependent on imports for much longer 
but for the presence of export controls.  In contrast to the expectations for the impact of 
policies leading to export controls, instead of slowing down or stopping technological 
accumulation under the space programme, the controls appears to have increased its pace.  
 
2. Expected Impact of MTCR on ‘target’ Countries 
 
Considerable numbers of works focus on the kind of impact the MTCR could have on the 
potential proliferators (e.g., Bailey and Rudney (ed), 1993; Jones, 1992; Fetter, 1991; 
Stanford University, 1991; Anthony (ed), 1991; Pullinger, 1991; Navias, 1990; Arnett et 
al. (ed), 1989; Karp, 1986 and 1988).  They discuss how the restrictions imposed by the 
MTCR on transfer of dual-use goods and technologies would affect the ‘target’ countries 
in different ways.  Most of them expect that the MTCR could only limit and slow down 
the spread of missile technologies in the developing world.   They expect it to “stretch out 
the development cycle, increasing development costs and impeding qualitative 
improvements” of the technology development programmes in a ‘target’ country thereby 
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forcing the country to abandon them (Stanford University, 1991, p. 6).  In the words of a 
US policy maker: 
 
With something as complicated as missiles, where basically ten nations control the technology, those ten 
countries can increase the time, the cost, the unreliability... associated with the programs of missile 
proliferators, and by increasing all of those factors, you of necessity force any government to ask whether 
this program is worth the price (Arnett et al. (1989), p.269).  
 
 
The literature suggests that the impact of MTCR on the technology development 
programmes in the ‘target’ countries could be the following: (a) slowing down or delaying 
the programmes; (b) increasing the cost of the programmes; (c) forcing states to abandon 
the programmes; and (d) may not affect the programmes significantly. 
 
This paper will analyse the developments under India’s space programme to find out the 
nature of impact of export controls. First, it will briefly discuss the relationship between 
different phases of technology accumulation and the impact of export control regime such 
as MTCR. 
 
3. Relationship between Two-Phase Model of Technological Accumulation and  
Impact of MTCR. 
 
The impact of the export control regimes such as MTCR on a particular country may 
depend upon whether it is in the formative phase or in the accumulative phase of 
technological development. If it is in the formative phase, then the impact is likely to be 
greater to the point of crippling the growth of technological accumulation.  On the other 
hand, if the country is in the accumulative phase, when the role of foreign input is less 
important, the MTCR is likely to be less influential.  This argument is illustrated with an 
explanation of the following two figures.  
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Figure-1 helps in understanding how the growth of capability in a particular technology, 
in this case space technology, can vary in different countries, influenced by their 
individual national innovation systems.  T1 to Tsn represents the scene of the growth of 
capabilities in space technology, in n number of countries.  They take different time 
periods to cross the threshold in space technology.   While Ts1 takes 10 years, Ts2 takes 
11, Ts(n-1) and Tsn take 17 and 20 years respectively. 
 
 
Figure-2 is used to explain the impact of the MTCR on countries trying to acquire space 
technological capability.   Here, Ts1 and Tsn represent respectively the most efficient and 
least efficient space/missile programmes in the developing countries.  That means 
country-1 and country-n represent the most efficient and the least efficient programmes 
respectively, because the former crossed the threshold in 10 years while the latter took 
nearly 20 years.   Between X1 and Xn the other countries cross the threshold.  As the need 
for foreign technological input is likely to be much greater in the formative phase than the 
accumulative phase, the space/missiles programmes of those countries which are in the 
zone X1Xn will be affected to a maximum extent.  It is possible that most these countries 
could be affected to the point of totally halting their programmes, as opposed to those 
programmes which reached a level above the line between X1 and Xn.   In these latter 
cases, the impact is likely to range from almost none to some significant level.  For 
example the most efficient programme, Ts1, may be affected to some extent, which might 
retard the process slightly.   It is represented in the figure by the slight distortion Ts1^.    In 
the same way, the least efficient programme Tsn may be affected to a considerable extent, 
which is represented in the figure by a very significant distortion Tsn^. 
 
4. Significance of Export controls to a Space programme 
 
India is one of the few developing countries, which have been running an ambitious space 
programme with an objective of developing a launch vehicle capable of launching a 3-
tonne satellite into the geo-synchronous orbit.   It has been dependent on foreign supplies, 
especially for critical items listed under Category-II of the Equipment and Technology 
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Annex of MTCR, to implement various projects while making effort to develop 
indigenously most of these items.  Therefore, restrictions imposed by the suppliers on 
export of these items and technologies could have an impact on the development projects 
of India’s space programme as shown by Table-1 
 
 
Table 1: Technologies Controlled by the MTCR and Their Significance in a Space 
Programme  
 
Technologies Controlled Significance in a Space Programme 
  
CATEGORY I  
  
Item-1: 
Complete rocket and unmanned air-vehicle systems 
with 500 kg payload and 300 km range. 
 
 
This will not affect a space programme significantly 
because already there have been very little transfer of 
complete rocket systems.  However, it may affect a space 
programme which is in an early stage and dependent on 
imported rocket  systems. 
  
Item-2: 
Complete sub-systems usable in Item-1: 
 
2 (a) individual rocket stages 
2 (b) re-entry vehicles  
2 (c) solid or liquid rocket engines  
2 (d) guidance sets  
2 (e) thrust vector controls 
2 (f) arming, fusing and firing mechanisms  and production 
facilities / equipment for the above items. 
 
These are technologies which are involved in civil launch 
vehicles as well as missiles.  Restrictions on the transfer 
of these technologies (except re-entry vehicles and 
certain mechanisms which have only military use) could 
affect seriously a launch vehicle programme in a ‘target’ 
country which is dependent on importing these items. 
  
CATEGORY II  
  
Item-3: 
Propulsion components usable in Item-1. 
 
3a: Light weight turbojet and turbofan engines; 
3b: Ramjet / Scramjet / Pulse jet / Combined cycle engines 
and their components; 
3c: Rocket motor cases, “interior lining”, insulation and 
nozzles; 
3d:  Staging and separation mechanisms and interstages; 
3e: Liquid and slurry propellant control systems and 
components therefor; 
3f: Hybrid rocket motors and components therefor. 
 
 
Many of these components are employed in the 
development of a satellite launch vehicle.  Restriction on 
them can  affect the development projects. 
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Technologies Controlled Significance in a Space Programme 
  
Item-4: 
Propellants and chemicals for propellants. 
 
4a: Propulsive substances - MMH, UDMH, 
Ammonium perchlorate, spherical aluminium powder, 
metal fuels in particle sizes less than 500 microns, 
HMX and RDX, perchlorates, chlorates or chromates 
mixed with powdered metals, carboranes, 
decorboranes, pentaboranes, liquid oxidisers such as 
N2O4 and IRFNA; 
4b: Polymeric substances - CTPB, HTPB, GAP, PBAA 
and PBAN; 4c: Composite propellants;4d: Other high 
energy density propellants such as Boron slurry; 
4e: Propellant additives and agents such as bonding 
agents, curing agents, burning rate modifiers, nitrate 
esters and nitrato plasticizers and stabilisers. 
 
These items are related to solid and liquid propellants for the 
rocket motors and engines.  Most of the developing countries 
which run civil space programmes are dependent on 
importing them.  Very few  countries can supply these items.  
Therefore, multilateral controls on these items could have a 
serious impact on development projects of a space 
programme. 
  
Item-5: 
Propellant production technology and equipment. 
 
5a: Production, handling or acceptance testing of liquid 
propellants; 
5b: Production, handling, mixing, curing, casting or 
acceptance testing of solid propellants. 
 
Propellant production technology and equipment are very 
important to develop large rockets to launch satellites.  
Particularly, the know-how  related to equipment and 
handling of  liquid propellants are not easy to master locally.  
Restriction on these items could severely affect the process of 
the accumulation of local capabilities. 
  
Item-6: 
Production technology and equipment for 
structural composites usable in systems in Item-1 
 
 
This involves very high technology and even the advanced 
developing countries are dependent on imports.  Export 
controls will create serious problems for development 
projects under a space programme. 
 
  
Item-7: 
Pyrolytic deposition / densification technology and 
equipment. 
 
This is a production technology.  Export restrictions will 
create problems for a space programme.  
  
Item-8:  
Structural materials usable in the systems in Item-
1. 
 
These are mainly used to fabricate rocket motor casings.  
Most developing countries are mainly dependent on imports.  
Restrictions on their export will create serious problems. 
  
Item-9: 
Instrumentation, navigation and direction finding 
equipment and systems and production and test 
equipment. 
 
These involve very high precision technologies.  Most of the 
developing countries are largely dependent on imports.  
Export controls will affect them seriously. 
  
Item-10: 
Flight control systems and the related ‘technology’. 
 
These are advanced systems and very important for launch 
vehicles.  Restriction on export can have a severe impact. 
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Technology Controlled Significance in a Space Programme 
  
Item-11: 
Avionics equipment and related ‘technology’ and 
components. 
 
This involves space electronics which are very important for 
launch vehicles and to some extent satellites.  Export controls 
can have serious impact on a space programme.  
 
 
Item-12: 
Launch support equipment, facilities and software 
for the systems in Item-1. 
 
These are relatively less complex and export controls may 
not have significant impact on  a space programme. 
 
 
Item-13: 
Analog and digital computers usable in systems in 
Item-1. 
 
Very advanced technology.  Export controls can create 
serious problems for a space programme. 
 
 
Item-14: 
Analog-to-digital converters usable in the systems in 
Item-1. 
 
This is also a complex technology and restrictions on export 
will have serious impact on a space programme. 
 
 
Item-15: 
Test facilities and test equipment usable  for the 
systems in Item-1 and Item-2. 
 
Most of the developing countries are dependent on foreign 
imports for test facilities and equipment, particularly during 
the initial period of development. Export controls could 
create serious problems.  
 
 
Item-16: 
Specially designed software with specially designed 
hybrid computers for modelling, simulation, or 
design, integration of systems in Items-1 and 2. 
 
This is an advanced area of technology where the impact of 
export controls could be severe for development projects of a 
space programme. 
 
 
Item-17: 
Reduced observables technology, materials and 
devices. 
 
These involve mostly military applications.  The restrictions 
over them may not affect a space programme. 
 
 
Item-18: 
Devices for use in protecting rocket systems and 
unmanned air vehicles against nuclear effects. 
 
This also involve mainly military technologies.  Export 
controls on them will not affect a space programme. 
However, as satellites employ some radiation hardened 
devices, the restriction may have some impact on  a space 
programme. 
 
 
Item-19: 
Complete rocket systems and unmanned vehicles 
not covered in Item-1 with the range of 300 km and 
above. 
 
Until the early 1990s, these were freely exported to many 
developing countries.  Export controls may not have serious 
impact on a space programme. 
 
 
Item-20: 
Complete sub-systems usable in systems in Item-19. 
 
It appears that many developing countries have already 
acquired these subsystems.  Export controls may not have a 
serious impact on a space programme. 
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The following sections will discuss the impact of MTCR in different areas of space 
technology, that is, rockets, satellites and rocket launching and spacecraft control 
facilities. 
 
5. Impact of Export Controls on Rocket Technology Development 
 
Figure-3 illustrates the competence building activities in the area of rocket technology 
during different phases.  During the leaning phase, that is, between mid-1960s and early-
1970s, India developed different types of sounding rockets.   Between the mid-1970s and 
early-1990s, India has developed three launch vehicles, that is, SLV-3, Augmented 
satellite launch vehicle (ASLV), and Polar Satellite launch vehicle (PSLV).  The first two 
were experimental launchers and the PSLV was an operational launcher.  During the 
1990s, India was developing the Geo-stationary satellite launch vehicle (GSLV) that 
would be capable of launching a 3-tonne class satellite.  Table-2 provides the salient 
features of these launchers.  Until the late 1970s, that is, before the launch of the SLV-3, 
India did not experience stringent export controls in this area, although there were 
restrictions.  During this period there were two important technology transfers from 
France, that is, the Centaure sounding rocket technology and the Viking liquid engine 
technology for PSLV.  Further, India was able to import most of the critical items.  
However, since the early-1980s India started facing increasing difficulties from export 
controls.   
 
Since the late-1970s, that is, long before the MTCR came into force, there has been a 
rapid growth in the volume and the complexity of the indigenous technology development 
under the space programme.  The major catalyst behind this appears to be the pressure 
from export controls.  At the time India was facing severe difficulties with its nuclear 
programme because of the problems created by the export controls. The space 
establishment in India could hardly ignore this turn of events, which would have 
implications for its programme in the future.1  This concern, more than anything else, 
appears to have forced Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) to undertake a 
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planned and organised indigenous programme with the main aim of overcoming export 
control problems.2 
 
Learning Phase 
(Till 1973)
1. Handling and launching 
of foreign sounding rockets 
to conduct scientific 
experiments
2. Centaure Sounding 
Rocket technology transfer 
from France
3. Production of Centaure 
under Licence
4. Indigenous development 
of Rohini Series sounding 
rockets
 
Experimental Phase 
(Till 1992)
1. Development of SLV-3 
and ASLV experimental 
rockets for launching 
satellites into Lower Earth 
orbit
2. Major effort to 
indigenously produce 
critical items
3. Collaboration with 
CNES to develop Viking 
liquid engine for Ariane 
rocket
4. Technology transfer of 
Viking to India
Operational Phase 
(Since early-1990s)
1. Development of PSLV  
operational rocket for 
launching Indian Remote 
Sensing satellites (1 tonne) 
into sun synchronous orbit
2. Development of GSLV 
operational rocket to launch 
INSAT-2 class (2 tonne) 
satellites into 
geo-stationary orbit
3.Major effort: indigenous 
development of Cryogenic 
technology
Figure 3: Different Phases of Rocket Technology Development in India  
 
 
 
In the mid-1970s, the planners in ISRO formulated a programme to develop indigenously 
certain critical items needed by the launch vehicle programme such as titanium alloy 
forging and the production of maraging steel, ammonium perchlorate, hydroxyl 
terminated polybutadiene (HTPB), unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH) and 
nitrogen tetroxide.  Some of these items were not required until several years later.  This 
programme had achieved good results and a large number of items (for launch vehicles) 
were developed indigenously long before the MTCR came into force.  This suggests that 
both the expectations about export controls and their imposition provided incentives to 
develop capabilities internally.  These occurred because the MTCR prevented a ‘target’ 
country from acquiring these capabilities through technology transfer.  It appears from the 
  
11 
evidence to be quite likely that India would have followed a different approach towards 
competence building in the absence of export controls, and, as a result, it is likely to have 
remained dependent on others for much longer time. 
 
Table 2: Salient Features of ISRO’s Launch Vehicles 
 
Feature SLV-3 ASLV PSLV GSLV 
Gross Lift-off Weight  17 t 39 t 275 t 400 t 
Maximum Diameter 1.0 m 1.0 m 2.8 m 2.8 m 
Height 22.0 m 23.5 m 44.0 m 51.0 m 
Number of  Stages 4  5 4 3 
Propellants Solid Solid Solid & Liquid Solid, Liquid & 
Cryogenic 
Guidance Open-Loop 
Inertial 
Closed-Loop 
Inertial 
Closed-Loop 
Inertial 
Closed-Loop Inertial 
Orbit Injection Spin Stabilised Spin Stabilised 3-Axis Stabilised 3-Axis Stabilised 
Orbit Low Earth Orbit Low Earth Orbit Sun Synchronous 
Orbit 
Geo-stationary 
Transit Orbit 
Main Payload ROHINI 40 kg SROSS 150 kg IRS 1000 kg INSAT 2000-2500 kg 
Primary Mission Space Science & 
Technology 
Space Science & 
Technology 
Remote Sensing Communication & 
Meteorology 
Development Period 1972-1983 1982-1994 1982-1997 1991-98 
 
Source: S. C. Gupta, “Growth of Capabilities of India’s Launch Vehicles”, Current Science, Vol. 68., no. 7., 10 April 
1995. 
 
Particularly, the analysis of the PSLV project suggests that ISRO had to depend primarily 
on internal effort to execute the project in the face of increasingly stringent export 
controls.  This had caused some delays to the project.  However, ISRO appears to have 
succeeded in building threshold capabilities in both liquid and solid propulsion 
systems. In the case of GSLV, initially ISRO did not make much effort indigenously to 
develop cryogenic technology, as it was trying to import it as in the case of the Viking.   
However, India was forced to develop it indigenously after a technology transfer deal with 
Russia was cancelled because the US argued that the deal had violated the MTCR.  It also 
banned ISRO for two years from importing any relevant goods.  India’s response to this 
action suggests that, instead of affecting its programme adversely, the MTCR 
enforcement seems to have provided more incentives to develop the cryogenic technology 
locally.  Also, the US ban on ISRO made the Indian population aware of the difficulties 
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imposed export controls and generated a consensus on supporting the space and missile 
programmes.  The denial of cryogenic technology also made India to become more 
determined to develop technologies denied by the West with little if any regard to the 
cost. 
 
By the 1990s, capability building in India was predominantly being determined by local 
effort than by the technological imports.  In other words, the importance of technological 
imports had increasingly become marginal to project success during this period.  For 
example, it is likely that the effect of the denial of Viking technology in the early 1980s 
would have affected India to a greater degree than the denial of cryogenic technology in 
the 1990s.  The difference can be explained in terms of the timing of technology denials.  
In the 1990s, the valuable experiences accumulated through the absorption of Viking 
technology were available to help both ISRO and the industry in developing the cryogenic 
technology indigenously.  All the evidence points to the fact that the timing of the 
introduction and enforcement of export controls is a very important factor if there is to be 
a positive impact on the capability building and learning process in a ‘target’ country.  
The positive impact can lead to a stimulus to indigenous development which extends over 
existing capabilities in areas which have been built up previously through a mix of 
technology transfer and indigenous technology development programmes. 
 
6. Impact of Export Controls on Satellite Technology Development 
 
Starting with a simple spinning satellite, Aryabhata in 1975, ISRO had built 25 satellites 
by the early-2000  (see Table-3).  Over 25 years, it has acquired capabilities to build very 
complex, world class operational IRS (1-tonne) and INSAT-2 (2-tonne) satellites for 
remote sensing and communications, respectively. The process of satellite technology 
accumulation is illustrated by Figure-4.   
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Table 3: Satellites Built by ISRO Since 1970s 
 
Satellite Weight (Kg) Date of Launch Launched By 
Aryabhata 360 April 1975 Intercosmos (USSR)^ 
Bhaskara I 444 June 1979 Intercosmos (USSR)^ 
Rohini 35 August 1979 SLV-3 (India)* 
Rohini-I 35 July 1980 SLV-3 
Rohini-D1 32 May 1981 SLV-3 
APPLE 650 June 1981 Ariane Test Launch (ESA)^ 
Bhaskara II 436 November 1981 Intercosmos (USSR)^ 
Rohini-D2 41.5 April 1983 SLV-3 (India) 
SROSS-1 150 March 1987 ASLV-D (India)* 
IRS-1A 975 March 1988 Vostok (USSR) 
SROSS-2 150 July 1988 ASLV-D2 (India)* 
IRS-1B 975 August 1991 Vostok (USSR) 
SROSS-C1 106 May 1992 ASLV-D3 (India) 
INSAT-2A 1906 July 1992 Ariane (ESA) 
INSAT-2B 1906 July 1993 Ariane (ESA) 
IRS-1E 846 September 1993 PSLV-D1 (India)* 
SROSS-C2 113 May 1994 ASLV-D4 (India) 
IRS-P2 804 October 1994 PSLV-D2 (India) 
IRS-1C 1250+ December 1995 Molniya (Russia) 
INSAT-2C 2050+ December 1995 Ariane (ESA) 
IRS-P3 922 March 1996 PSLV-D3 (India) 
INSAT-2D 2500 June 1997 Ariane (ESA)* 
IRS-1D 1200 September 1997 PSLV-C1 (India) 
IRS-P4 1050 May 1999 PSLV-C2 (India) 
INSAT-3B 2070 March 2000  Ariane-5 (ESA)  
* Launch Failed; ^ Cost Free Launch; + Weighed at lift-off. 
 
Foreign collaboration appears to have played a very significant role during the formative 
phase, that is, until the mid-1980s, in competence building under the satellite programme 
in India.  Until the mid-1980s, India did not seem to have any problem with export 
controls.  It was able to import almost anything needed for its programme without 
hindrance. Therefore, in the case of the satellite technology there appears to have been no 
attempt to manage indigenous technology development process in an organised and 
planned manner as we have seen in the case of rocket technology.   There was no strategic 
planning for the development of critical items that might come under export controls in 
the future. It was likely that India preferred to depend on foreign imports for many critical 
items because they were easily available and cheaper compared to the development cost at 
home. 
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Accumulative 
Phase
(Since mid-1980s)
Formative  
Phase
(Till mid-1980s)
 Foreign Collaboration
1. Building Scientific Payloads for Sounding 
Rockets
2. Building Scientific Satellite
3. Building Experimental Satellites
4. Ground Experiments in Satellite TV 
Broadcastig and Telecommuications
5. Procuring Foreign Operational 
Communication Satellites
 Indigenous  Effort
(Some Components and materials Imported) 
1. Building One-tonne Operational Remote 
Sensing satellites and Two-tonne 
Communication satellites 
2. Building one-tonne advanced Remote 
Sensing satellites and 3.5 tonne 
Communication satellites
Scientific Satellite
Aryabhata satellite
Exp. Remote Sensing
Bhaskara-I and II
satellites
Ground Experiments
SITE and STEP
Exp. Communications
APPLE satellite
Operational  Satellites
INSAT-1 series 
(Bought from the US)
Remote Sensing
1. IRS-1 series
2. IRS-P series
Communications
1. INSAT-2 series
2. INSAT-3 series
Figure 4: Formative and Accumulative Phases of Competence Building in 
Satellite Technology in India
  
 
 In the second half of 1980s, when the IRS-1 and INSAT-2 projects were executed, India 
increasingly felt the pressure of export controls.  The developments under these projects 
suggest that the presence of export controls has significantly changed the approach 
towards indigenous technology development under the satellite programme.  It seems that 
India started planning and managing its indigenous effort in a manner so as to reduce 
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dependence on foreign countries.  Particularly, it appears to have accorded priority to the 
most critical items to avoid the problems created by the export controls as it had already 
done with its launch vehicle programme. 
 
7. Impact of Export Controls on Development of Ground Facilities 
 
Between the mid-1960s and mid-1980s, ISRO built a network of earth stations, rocket 
launching facilities and satellite tracking and control facilities in different parts of the 
country (see Figure-5).  This was the first area to benefit from a major indigenisation 
effort under the space programme since the technology was not very complex and the 
industry was confident of taking up the challenge.   It appears that India did not face 
many problems with export controls in this area as the technology was a low security risk 
to other countries.   This enabled India to forge foreign collaboration and international 
co-operation.  ISRO developed most of the ground equipment with the help of other 
R&D organisations in the country and the industry.  This effort was helped significantly 
by liberal imports of those items that could not be made locally.  This trend continued 
through each new project until the mid-1980s.  By then, when the MTCR was in place, 
India had already achieved extensive capabilities.  The MTCR was too late to affect India 
in a significant way in the area of ground facilities such as rocket launch support.  It is 
likely that India’s effort to build capabilities in this area would have been affected 
adversely, if there had been problems with export controls in the 1970s. The 
developments in this area suggest that India did not feel it necessary to follow a strategic 
approach towards indigenous technology development because of the absence of export 
controls.  Instead, it appears to have followed a ‘scientific’ approach whereby it chose to 
develop whatever technology was possible within its existing capabilities and to import 
the rest from other countries. It appears that export controls had little if any influence on 
this policy.  Instead, the main influential factors for this decision appear to have been the 
lower level of complexity of technologies involved, the existing capacity of the local 
industry, the economies of scale and financial constraints affecting decisions to opt for 
foreign imports. 
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Rocket Launching 
Stations
Spacecraft Control / 
Tracking Facilities
1. TERLS (1963):
 
For launching sounding 
rockets
2. SHAR (1977): 
For satellite launch vehicles
3. Balasore (1978):
For  meteorological 
sounding rockets
I. ISTRAC:
(Five network stations)
1. SHAR I (1975) and SHAR II 
(1979) at Sriharikota
2. Satellite Control Station  at 
Trivandrum (1975)  
3. Ahmedabad Ground Station (1979)
4. Car Nicobar Ground Station (1979)
5. Satellite Tracking and Ranging 
Station at Kavalur (1977)
II. Satellite Control Centres:
1. Satellite Control Centre at SHAR 
(1981)
2. Master Control Facility at Hassan 
for INSAT (1982)
3a. Satellite Control Centre at 
Bangalore for IRS (1988)
3b. Ground Staion in Mauritius for 
IRS (1987) 
Infrastucture for 
Spacecraft Utilisation
Department of 
Space  
(DOS)/ISRO
Other 
Government 
Agencies:
 
Departments such as 
P&T, Telecom, I&B, 
and Mateorology
Area I:
 Satellite 
Communications
TV and Radio Broadcasting, 
and Telecommunication
Area II: Meteorology
 Weather forcasting / 
Disaster warning
Area III:
 Remote 
Sesing
Agriculture, Geology 
survey, Forestry & Ecology, 
Soil survey, Water 
resources, Wasteland 
mapping, Oceanography, 
Climatology and so on.
Figure 5: Ground Infrastructure Developed under the Indian 
Space Programme   
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Table 4: Comparison of the Impact of Export Controls On Competence Building in 
Different Areas of Space Technology 
 
Area of Technology Rockets Satellites Rocket Launching and 
Spacecraft Control Facilities 
 
   
Degree of Complexity Highly Complex Complex, but relatively less 
than the rockets 
Less complex 
 
   
Presence of Export 
Controls: 
   
 
   
(a) Until Early 1980s Generally strict controls even 
before the MTCR (because of 
India’s nuclear programme), 
particularly on transfer of 
technologies. But, imports of 
critical items were possible 
and alternate sources were 
available. 
 
A much weaker controls.  It was 
possible to import most of the 
critical items. 
 
Almost no controls.  It was 
possible to import freely, 
including technology transfers. 
 
   
(b) From mid 1980s Very stringent multilateral 
controls, formalised by 
MTCR. 
Stringent controls.  It became 
difficult to import some of the 
critical items which could be 
imported freely in the past. 
Very few controls.  Occasional 
denials. 
 
   
Balance between 
Local and Imported 
Supplies: 
   
 
   
(a) Until early 1980s Strong indigenous effort.  But, 
critical dependence on 
imports.  Significant foreign 
technological assistance, i.e., 
international collaborations, 
technology transfers, and 
supply of critical items. 
Strong local effort.  But, 
predominantly dependent on 
imports. Very significant foreign 
technological assistance, i.e., 
technical assistance to build and 
test satellites, cost free 
launchings, transfer of 
knowledge through procurement 
contracts, joint experiments, and 
supply of microelectronics and 
other critical items. 
Very strong indigenous effort 
accompanied by imports of 
large amounts of equipment 
that was critical and could not 
be made locally. 
 
 
   
(b) From mid 1980s Very strong indigenous 
capabilities in almost all areas 
except a few such as materials 
and cryogenic technology.  
Very limited imports due to 
export controls.   
Very high indigenous 
capabilities in all aspects except 
space electronics and materials.  
Foreign imports still significant.    
Almost completely indigenous 
capability. Much less imports. 
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Area of Technology Rockets Satellites Rocket Launching and 
Spacecraft Control Facilities 
 
   
Impact of Export 
Controls: 
   
 
   
(a) Until early 1980s Strict controls even before the 
MTCR and the experience of 
the nuclear programme forced 
India to follow a strategic 
approach towards achieving 
technological independence.  
Development of critical items 
was undertaken to overcome 
possible export controls in the 
future. Although export 
controls caused problems, 
they did not affect the 
programme seriously. 
Export controls did not cause 
serious problems.  Although 
India was making strong 
indigenous effort,  It did not 
follow a strategic approach 
towards technology 
development as in the case of 
rocket technology.  It was able 
to import almost all critical 
items without many problems. It 
was not seriously concerned by 
this dependence. 
The influence of export 
controls was the least strong.  
The absence of export controls 
allowed free imports. 
However, India made very 
strong efforts from the 
beginning to create local 
capabilities.  It was not content 
to remain dependent on 
imports.  Factors other than 
export controls seem to have 
played a role in this approach. 
 
 
   
(b) From mid 1980s Export controls caused some 
delays to projects such as 
PSLV and GSLV.  However, 
the long term impact appears 
to have been insignificant.  
Export controls seem to have 
provided incentives to 
develop local capabilities 
irrespective of cost. 
Export controls caused problems 
for the projects such as IRS-1 
and INSAT-2 satellites.  The 
pressure from export controls 
forced India to strategically plan 
and manage indigenous 
technology development to 
overcome dependence on 
imports for critical items. 
Problems of export controls 
were insignificant.  By this 
time India had already created 
very strong local capabilities.  
From the beginning, because of 
the absence of export controls, 
India appears to have followed 
a ‘scientific’ approach to 
competence building in 
contrast to the case of rocket 
technology. 
 
   
 
 
8. Comparison of Impact of Export Controls on Different Areas of Space Programme 
 
One method that can be employed to analyse the impact of export controls on 
competence building under the space programme is to compare the developments under 
different areas of space technology, that is, rocket technology, satellite technology, and 
rocket launching and spacecraft control facilities.  Table-4 illustrates these developments 
at different time periods, that is, until the early 1980s and after the 1980s.  Table-4 also 
shows the importance of the timing of export controls.  Until the early 1980s, despite the 
presence of export controls to varying degrees in different areas of space technology, 
India was able to import most of its requirements.  This was possible mainly because of 
the availability of alternate sources of suppliers and the absence of a co-ordinated 
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multilateral approach towards enforcing these controls.  As a result, India was able to 
build strong capabilities in all the areas of space technology.  The role of foreign imports 
for competence building during this period appears to have been very important.  If 
export controls had been enforced very stringently during this period, the competence 
building process under Indian space programme is likely to have been affected very 
seriously.   
 
By the time these controls became stringent due to the multilateral approach in mid 
1980s, India had already accumulated threshold capabilities in most of the critical areas 
as shown in Table-4.  This helped the country to reduce dependence on foreign imports 
and to overcome most of the problems created by export controls.   This shows that the 
timing of export controls has a very strong impact on a target country. 
 
Table-4 suggests that the presence or absence of export controls has influenced the 
decisions regarding the way indigenous technology development was undertaken in the 
Indian space programme.  It depicts three different illustrations of this pattern.  First, it 
shows an area, that is, rocket technology, where export controls were present long before 
the MTCR came into force.  Second, it illustrates an area, that is, satellite technology, 
where there were fewer controls until the mid-1980s and relatively more controls after 
the MTCR.  Third, it shows an area, that is, ground support facilities, where there was 
almost no export control.  In the first case, that is, rocket technology, even in the early 
1970s, ISRO anticipated problems with the import of items for its launch vehicle 
programme because of the experience of India’s nuclear energy programme.  The 
presence of export controls during the 1970s appears to have influenced the decision- 
makers to follow a strategic approach towards indigenous technology development. 
 
Table-4 also shows that India had made strong indigenous efforts in all areas of space 
technology both before and after the mid 1980s, that is, before and after the MTCR.  
Because of the indigenous effort during the 1970s and early 1980s, the country was able 
to accumulate strong local capabilities which eventually helped it to overcome stringent 
export controls after mid-1980s.  India appears to have accumulated a high level of 
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indigenous capabilities in at least 18 out of 20 items proscribed by MTCR.  India attained 
this level of capabilities in some of these items long before export controls became very 
stringent in mid 1980s. Further, Table-4 suggests that indigenous effort played a 
predominant role in capability building from mid-1980s when export controls became 
stringent. This suggests that export controls might provide incentive for indigenous 
technology development.  However, Table-4 also shows the important role of foreign 
technological inputs in building capabilities in all the areas, particularly until the early 
1980s.   This suggests that, in the absence of foreign technological inputs during this 
period, it is likely that the pace of capability building in all areas would have been 
relatively slower.  Particularly, the impact would have been more severe in the areas of 
rocket and satellite technology because of the complexity involved.   This suggests that 
timing of export controls and the stage of technological capability of a target country at 
the time mostly determine the impact of export controls. 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
The evidence suggests that foreign technological inputs played a major role in 
competence building under India’s space programme until the early 1980s, that is, during 
the formative period. The absence of these inputs is likely to have seriously affected 
competence building at the time.  This shows that export controls could have serious 
impact on a target country during the formative phase of capability building.   By the 
time the MTCR came into force in the mid 1980s, India’s dependence on foreign imports 
had been reduced to a limited number of areas such as microelectronics and advanced 
materials.  The impact of export controls such as the MTCR on the space programme 
appears to have been limited to causing some short term delays to its projects.  
 
The comparison of technology developments under different areas of space technology 
such as rockets, satellites, and ground support facilities shows that, instead of adversely 
affecting competence building in India, export controls such as the MTCR forced the 
country to develop independence from foreign sources of technology.  The presence and 
fear of export controls appears to have forced ISRO to follow a strategic approach 
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towards competence building in critical areas to avoid dependence on foreign countries.  
This happened first in the area of rockets and then in the area of satellites.   
 
In the case of rocket technology, ISRO appears to have anticipated stringent export 
controls because of the experience of India’s nuclear energy programme.  The fear of 
these controls forced it to manage its R&D strategically from the mid-1970s with the aim 
of avoiding future problems created by export controls.  In the case of satellite 
technology, there were considerably fewer export controls before mid 1980s and ISRO 
appears to have followed a ‘scientific’ approach towards competence building.  There 
were no planned R&D activities to create capabilities aimed at circumventing future 
export controls.  However, increasingly stringent export controls from mid 1980s appear 
to have forced ISRO to follow a strategic approach to technology development.  In the 
area of ground support facilities, the near absence of export controls enabled ISRO to 
take a ‘scientific’ approach towards R&D management throughout the period examined 
in the study as it was possible to import all its requirements.  Nevertheless, the absence of 
export controls did not lead the country to become completely dependent on imports.  
ISRO made strong indigenous efforts towards competence building in this area as it had 
done in the areas of rockets and satellites.  The approach and the motivation appear to 
have been different in these two cases, but the outcome was similar.  The developments 
in rocket and satellite technology suggest that export controls might have provided an 
incentive for building indigenous capabilities.  However, the analysis of competence 
building in ground support facilities suggests that the absence of export controls does not 
necessarily lead to a developing country like India remaining dependent on foreign 
imports. 
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Notes 
 
1
 It should be kept in mind that the space programme was run by the nuclear establishment for nearly a 
decade before it became separated. Also, most of the scientists and engineers of ISRO originally came from 
the  nuclear establishment and had a very good understanding of its problems.  
 
2
 Interview with Prof. Satish Dhawan (Former Chairman of ISRO) and a former ISRO engineer involved in 
planning the programme. 
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